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Resumo
Terrorismo Nuclear e Radiológico: Uma Ameaça 
Gerível
A ameaça de terrorismo nuclear ou radiológico tem 
constituído um tema regular nos meios de comuni-
cação social. Não obstante, uma análise abrangente 
revela uma ameaça real embora limitada, capaz de 
ser gerida por Servi ços de Informações, ações de 
vigilância e uma cultura eficaz de segurança. Este 
artigo descreve não só os parâmetros limitados da 
ameaça do terrorismo nuclear e radiológico, como 
posteriormente expõe as diversas fo rmas a partir 
das quais a comunidade internacional, Nações e 
instituições contribuem para uma diminuição da 
proba bilidade de um ataque desta natureza.
Abstract
The threat of a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack 
has become a consistent theme in news reports and 
popular media. But a comprehensive analysis reveals a 
real but limited threat, one that is manageable through 
intelligence, vigilance, and effective security culture. 
This article describes the limited parameters of the 
nuclear and radiological terrorist threat, and then 
describes various ways that the international commu-
nity, nations and institutions are helping reduce the 
likelihood of such an attack.
Nação e Defesa 104
James J. F. Forest and S. K. Aghara
Introduction
In June 2014, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Co mmittee held a hearing about the status of radiological security in the United 
States. The comments and debate focused primarily on the findings of a Go vernment 
Accountability Office (GAO) report about the need for additional actions to increase 
the security of U.S. industrial radiological sources (GAO, 2014). Politicians and 
public commentators in America pounced on the alleged inadequacies of the 
Obama administration’s security policies, predicting that doom and destruction 
was just around the corner. And recent highly publicized thefts of radiological 
source material in other countries underscored the concerns raised at the Senate 
hearing.
For example, in December 2013, an armed group in Mexico stole a truck containing 
cobalt-60 pellets (a radiological source used in hospital radiotherapy machines), 
generating headlines for several days until it was found abandoned in a field 
(Simpson, 2013). In May 2014, authorities in Ukraine apprehended a group of mili-
tants smuggling a radioactive source (thought to be uranium-235) in a makeshift 
container (Global Security Newswire, 2014b). In July, a truck transporting a con-
tainer of iridium-192 (frequently used for industrial imaging purposes) was seized 
by thieves in a Mexico City suburb, but recovered a day later (Global Security 
Newswire, 2014a). And also in July, Sunni militants in Iraq seized 88 pounds of 
“low grade uranium” from a university in the northern city of Mosul.
However, in none of these cases were civilians in imminent or real danger. In the 
thefts in Mexico, the thieves very likely didn’t even know what they were stealing 
(Romo, Parker and Castillo, 2013). And according to Olli Heinonen - the former 
chief inspector of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the low-grade 
uranium stolen by the Iraqi militants was unsuitable for use in a so-called “dirty 
bomb,” which uses conventional explosives to spread radiation (Cowell, 2014). 
To be sure, there are reasons for concern and vigilance. The IAEA has investigated 
more than 20 cases of theft or loss of nuclear materials each year.1 As IAEA 
sp okeswoman Gill Tudor notes: “any loss of regulatory control over nuclear and 
other radioactive materials is a cause for concern” (Cowell, 2014). But a balanced, 
well-informed analysis of the threat is critical for devising successful responses to 
complex security challenges like terrorism and nuclear proliferation. In truth, 
despite the dramatic headlines and posturing of some politicians, the threat of 
1 For example, see the summary compiled by Max Fisher and Richard Johnson for The Washingto n 
Post, published on December 5th, 2013, compiled from data provided by the IAEA Incident and 
Trafficking Database and Nuclear Threat Initiative. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/a-look-at-recent-nuclear-material-incidents/2013/12/05/c6f3edb6-5e17-11e3-
be07-006c776266ed_graphic.html. 
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nuclear and radiological terrorism is both limited and manageable, for a number of 
often overlooked reasons that we will describe in this article.
To frame a more balanced analysis, we can begin with the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s new Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in June 
2014, which “seeks to ensure that the United States and its allies and partners are 
neither attacked nor coerced by hostile actors with weapons of mass destruction” 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). The strategy articulates three primary areas of 
effort: preventing acquisition of WMD, containing and reducing the threat of exis-
ting WMD, and responding to WMD crises effectively. This timely document notes 
that the U.S. will “accept risk in areas where WMD use is implausible, infeasible, or 
would have limited effects so that resources can be focused on enhancing flexible 
response capabilities tailored to the most likely and operationally significant 
threats” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). Decades of scientific study on the 
effects of nuclear and radiological weapons has resulted in a clear understanding of 
what the most “operationally significant threats” are. However, the question of 
“most likely” has been subject to far more conjecture and speculation than fac-
tually-informed analysis.
Thus, in this article we examine the various technical, strategic and tactical dimen-
sions of this question, concluding that radiological terrorism is considerably more 
likely than nuclear terrorism, and that the possibility of a radiological terrorist 
attack is limited within very narrow parameters. A terrorist group would require a 
perfect (and very rare) mix of resources, strategic rationale, opportunities and luck 
in order to successfully cross the radiological weapons threshold. Moreover, there 
are thousands of agencies, with hundreds of thousands of analysts and field agents, 
working every day to prevent such an attack. This is not an argument for compla-
cency, but rather, an appeal to place the nuclear and radiological threat into a more 
appropriate - and less hyperbolic - perspective.
Nuclear and Radiological Weapons: A Quick Review
To begin with, not all commentators on these issues seem to understand that nuclear 
weapons and radiological weapons are much different from each other. Nuclear 
weapons are both extremely powerful and complicated to construct and store, 
especially by a non-State actor. They require fissile material - highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium-239 - which can release massive amounts 
of energy in an uncontrolled chair reaction. Other candidate fissile materials con-
sidered potentially viable for nuclear weapons use include neptunium-237, ameri-
cium-241 and reactor-grade plutonium. It is important to note that these fissile 
materials must be very pure and highly enriched (greater than 90 percent) for 
weapons use. Fissile materials are used in nuclear reactors at much lower enrich-
ments (3-5 percent), where carefully controlled levels of fission produce energy for 
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cities around the world. Nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons are fundamentally 
different in design. Nuclear weapons are designed to harness the release of fission 
energy for destructive purposes.
There are two basic kinds of nuclear weapon designs – gun-type and implosion. 
The former uses two carefully shaped concentrations of HEU, and a conventional 
explosion forces one into the other causing a chain reaction. Implosion weapons are 
far more difficult, requiring extremely precise engineering to ensure that all the 
small conventional explosive charges surrounding a sphere detonate at exactly the 
same nanosecond in order to compress the core of plutonium inside (otherwise, the 
device would function like a balloon popping, in which the plutonium core would 
be blown out of the device instead of causing the chain reaction).
Obviously, the key to nuclear weapons is the fissile material. Because access to HEU 
and plutonium-239 is constrained and regulated, states and terrorists face an 
en ormous challenge acquiring this essential ingredient. As Graham Allison so 
el oquently argued a decade ago, the implications for global security are simple and 
clear: without fissile material, you cannot have a nuclear weapon (Allison, 2004). 
The difficulty in gaining access to fissile materials, as well as the very complex (and 
expensive) nature of these weapons in general, help explain why today only eight 
countries (China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the US) 
are officially recognized as nuclear powers (Israel is an additional, but “unofficial” 
nuclear power). Additionally, there are another 25 countries with more than 1 kg of 
weapons-usable nuclear material. Meanwhile, there are 186 other countries in the 
world who do not have nuclear weapons, and nearly all of those countries will 
never have them.
Compared to the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, radiological sources 
are far more prevalent throughout the world. Radioisotopes - materials that emit 
radiation as they decay - are used in medicine to treat a wide array of cancers and 
other diseases. They are also found in various kinds of measurement instruments 
used in research and in a wide range of industries. Some radioisotopes can be used 
in weapons to make people sick through radiation exposure, depending on their 
half-life (the time during which the isotope decays, which determines the amount 
of radioactive energy released). Further, the radioactive source would need to be in 
a certain form to be useful in a weapon: think pellets, powder, or liquid, rather than 
the metals in which radioactive sources are sometimes stored.
In contrast to the nuclear weapons described above, there are no officially declared 
radiological weapons stockpiles. Within the past two decades, only one country - 
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein - pursued a radiological weapons program, and it was 
abandoned after the government came to realize that the enormous costs involved 
in making and maintaining such weapons would yield only modestly useful 
be nefits. Further, according to a recent National Defense University report, no new 
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technological developments regarding radiological weapons are foreseen (Caves 
and Carus, 2014).
Understanding the key differences between nuclear and radiological weapons is a 
necessary first step toward meaningful analysis of today’s security challenges. A 
military-caliber nuclear weapon, stolen or otherwise acquired from a nation’s 
stockpile, is considered by most analysts to be a highly unlikely terrorism scenario. 
This means there are three most likely types of weapons for terrorists to consider, 
listed here in order of decreasing complexity and difficulty: an improvised nuclear 
device (IND), a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or a radiological emission 
device (RED). As noted earlier, any kind of nuclear device requires fissile materials. 
Even a group of highly skilled, engineering-savvy terrorists might be able to fabri-
cate a rudimentary gun-type weapons casing, they still face tremendous difficulty 
acquiring the right amount of fissile material, and in a form which allows them to 
manipulate and shape it to fit their weapons design. In contrast, a RDD requires 
radioactive materials of a suitable amount and in a format that can be dispersed via 
a conventional explosive, sprayer, or so forth.
And the least complicated of these types of weapons is the RED, which simply 
requires a type of radioactive source in virtually any form that can be placed dis-
cretely in a location which (the terrorists would hope) will over a period of time 
lead to radiation sickness among the victims before the weapon is discovered and 
disabled or removed. But even here, an RED requires the right kind of radioactive 
source: it must decay fast enough to produce high levels of radioactivity, but not 
become depleted so quickly that the victims are not exposed to enough radioacti-
vity to cause the intended damage; it can be metals or liquids or other format, but 
must be in a shape and size that will not attract suspicion from the target; and it 
must be in a form that can be handled effectively by the terrorists and delivered to 
the target. Thus, even the simplest kind of radiological weapon is significantly 
compli cated and difficult to deliver effectively.
To sum up, the technical aspects of these weapons are unique and extremely reliant 
on access to specific substances that are highly regulated and controlled. In recent 
years, a wide variety of books, movies and television shows have often portrayed 
terrorist groups easily acquiring and detonating a nuclear or radiological weapon. 
But the reality is that most terrorist groups could not—and in fact, most do not even 
want to - cross the nuclear or radiological weapons threshold.
The Terrorist Threat
At the outset, it must be emphasized that there have been very few terrorist plots 
involving radiological or nuclear weapons, and to date none of them have been 
successful. There is an extensive history of terrorist attacks over the past 120 years, 
perpetrated by a wide spectrum of groups and individuals: anarchists, left-wing 
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and right-wing extremists, ethno-nationalists, religious extremists (including 
Zi onists, Islamists, and violent opponents of abortion), environmental extremists, 
and many others. And yet, only a tiny fraction of these attacks have involved any 
kind of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials. Further, as 
John Parachini has observed, even the rare incidents that involved the use of these 
kinds of weapons have hardly threatened mass destruction (Parachini, 2014).
According to the historical record, no terrorist group has even come close to having 
a nuclear weapon. Further, across the entire spectrum of terrorist, insurgents and 
other armed groups, only a small handful of militants in Chechnya have managed 
to assemble a rudimentary radiological weapon. During 1995 and 1996, Chechen 
militant leader Shamil Basayev made a series of threats to detonate radioactive con-
tainers in Russian cities, to target nuclear facilities in Russia, and even to explode a 
nuclear device. To support these ominous threats, he provided videos and photos 
displaying containers of radioactive materials (likely cobalt-60, cesium-137, or 
strontium-90), and told a Russian television network where to find a container of 
cesium-137 he had arranged to have buried in Moscow’s Izmailovskiy Park (Bale, 
2012). However, all of this fear-mongering and threats came to nothing: as of this 
writing, no radiological weapon has ever been successfully used by a terrorist or 
other violent non-state actor.
Of course, one could argue that the historical record is a poor judge of the future, 
given the extraordinary scientific and technical advances we see around us each 
year. Thus, to better understand the contemporary terrorist threat involving these 
weapons, we must examine the intentions of a particular terrorist group, and then 
examine the capabilities of that group (Forest, 2012). What we find in doing so is 
that among the hundreds of terrorist groups around the world, only a very small 
handful have any possible link to a radiological or nuclear threat.
Terrorists differ broadly in terms of intentions, resources and capabilities. We know 
a great deal about the intentions of terrorists because they tell us, through their 
ideological propaganda, what they want, and why they feel that violence is the 
only way they can get it. Terrorists use violence as a means to an end. They have 
objectives and goals, articulated in their ideologies, and believe that these can only 
be achieved through the use of violence. In most instances, the pursuit of power is 
central to their cause: power to shape the political future, power over a piece of 
terri tory (e.g., ethno-national terrorists), power to assert racial dominance over 
o thers (e.g., right-wing terrorists), power to change national policies (e.g., anti-abor-
tion, environmental, animal rights extremists), and so forth. When we unpack the 
details of terrorist groups within each of these ideological categories, we find that 
terrorists generally do not kill for the sake of killing. Further, analysis of terrorist 
manuals and interviews with incarcerated terrorist leaders reveal a common pa ttern 
of worrying about counterproductive violence. From the IRA to Hamas to al-Qaeda, 
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we have seen terrorist group leaders condemn or try to reign in operatives whom 
they felt were engaged in activities that were so violent, they were jeopardizing the 
group’s efforts to recruit and muster support among a target constituency.
Analysis of the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, both historical and contempo-
rary, reveals that most terrorist groups have no interest in weapons of mass destruc-
tion, opting instead for more conventional weaponry in their attacks. Only a small 
handful have shown any indication that they would ever want a nuclear or radio-
logical weapon. From this perspective, we come to understand more clearly, why 
concerns about radiological and nuclear terrorism may be exaggerated.
The important point to make here is that commentators who would have you 
believe that all terrorists are the same do not have a solid understanding of terro-
rism. To formulate effective counterterrorism efforts, especially pertaining to radio-
logical and nuclear terrorism, we must understand who might want such weapons, 
and why. From decades of research on this question, most scholars and government 
analysts have concluded that only a very small proportion of the world’s terrorists 
have any interest in crossing the radiological or nuclear threshold. Of these, most 
have similar tendencies: a religiously-based, typically apocalyptic ideology in 
which massive destruction creates an opportunity for a better world; a charismatic 
leader; a high level of paranoia; and a commitment to innovation and physical risk 
taking (Dolnik and Forest, 2012). Think Aum Shinrikyo (the Japanese cult responsi-
ble for the 1995 Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway) rather than any of the most 
well-known terrorist groups like Hamas, Hizballah, FARC or the IRA.
For a terrorist group considering any kind of attack, a considerable number of stra-
tegic, tactical and operational questions must be answered. For example: What kind 
of weapon do we want to use, and why? How will we acquire all the necessary 
materials? How will we afford it? Who in our group has the knowledge to construct 
this weapon? Where will we construct this weapon, and where will we store it 
securely until the time of delivery? How will we deliver the weapon to the target 
unhindered? Where? How can we test the weapon to see if it will actually work as 
planned? These and many other questions must be answered by the terrorist group 
as their plot unfolds. Bad decisions at any point along the way will jeopardize their 
chances of success.
The choice of weapon obviously impacts the nature of these questions. Whenever a 
terrorist group devotes its time, money and other resources toward an attack plan, 
they want to maximize the likelihood that their objectives will be achieved. And 
yet, terrorist groups are limited by what their members are capable of doing. 
Fu rther, more complex terrorist plots have lower chances of success. Thus, a diffi-
cult and complicated nuclear or radiological weapons is seen as less desirable than 
the suicide bomb vest that has been tested and proven effective by terrorists in Sri 
Lanka, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and many other countries.
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Properly handling and storing nuclear or radioactive materials is dangerous and 
requires sophisticated knowledge and skill, but virtually no terrorist groups have 
attracted competent radiological technicians or nuclear engineers. Further, even if a 
group does manage to overcome the significant technical challenges to build what 
they believe to be a viable nuclear or radiological weapon, they will likely be un able 
to test the weapon to ensure they have the correct design or delivery mechanism—
again, raising the possibility that their attack plan will fail. In a sense, terrorist 
groups are somewhat risk-averse: their fear of failure can be a constraining factor in 
their decision-making. This is an often overlooked facet of terrorism threat analysis, 
one that should give us optimism about the future when it comes to nuclear and 
radiological terrorism.
Overall, there are many kinds of technical challenges associated with radiological 
and nuclear weapons, and these challenges influence a terrorist group’s deci - 
sion-making about whether to invest resources in trying to develop (or acquire) 
and use them. A group may want to use a nuclear weapon, but since no terrorist 
group to date has demonstrated the capability to make a nuclear weapon, their 
only other option is to acquire or steal one from a state. But under what condi-
tions would a state give or sell a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? While some 
hardcore right-wing politicians in the U.S. would have us believe otherwise, Iran, 
North Korea and Pakistan are governed by people who think strategically, and 
there is no doubt they understand that it would never be in their country’s 
self-interests to willingly allow a terrorist group to have one of their nuclear 
weapons. The consequences of doing so would be catastrophic—not just for the 
victims of the terrorist attack, but also for the country that provided such a 
weapon. Given the sophistication of modern forensic science, states and terrorists 
have to consider the issue of attribution: following an attack involving a nuclear 
weapon, it is virtually assured that the international community will be able to 
identify the origin of the fissile material and the associated weapon. Condemna-
tion and punishing attacks in retribution are highly likely.
It is doubtful that the leaders of any country – or their military leaders (which are 
more likely to have direct control over their country’s nuclear arsenal) – can be 
considered suicidal. So, it strains credulity to imagine any country’s leaders belie-
ving it would be in their best interests to provide a weapon to a terrorist group. 
Alternatively, could a nuclear weapon be stolen and then detonated by a terrorist 
group? The only likely scenario would require a significant amount of insider assis-
tance, not only to acquire the weapon but also to bypass the safeguards used on all 
nuclear weapons worldwide. Combined with the fact that all nuclear-armed coun-
tries are determined not to let terrorists acquire and use one of their nuclear 
we apons, the odds are stacked against this kind of scenario. The possibility of theft 
or illicit trafficking of nuclear material is far more likely, and historical records 
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show that there have been a number of incidents reported worldwide. As men-
tioned earlier, only a small number of countries have significant quantities of fissile 
materials. The facilities and materials in these countries are under strict safeguards 
and security regulations. There are enduring concerns about fissile material secu-
rity in some countries due to political and economic instability, as well as inconsis-
tency and lack of a global security standard. For example, numerous incidents of 
theft and illicit trafficking were reported between 1991 and 1999 in Russia and for-
mer Soviet Union states. The theft of nuclear material is partially related to security 
concerns associated with radiological sources, as discussed in more detail below.
In comparison to the threat of nuclear terrorism, a radiological terrorist attack is 
considered more likely. To begin with, there is a far more plentiful array of radio-
logical sources used in medicine, research and industry worldwide. In the United 
States alone, radiological source materials are used by nearly 800 companies in over 
1,400 facilities (Roth, 2014). A majority of these involve machines that use iri-
dium-192 or cobalt-60, both considered “high risk” radiological source materials 
because they emit higher levels of radioactivity than most others. A U.S. govern-
ment report released in June found that facilities using “high-risk industrial radio-
logical sources” face challenges in (1) securing mobile and stationary sources 
(including radiography cameras used to test pipeline welds) and (2) protecting 
against an insider threat (GAO, 2014). An earlier report, released by the U.S. 
go vernment in 2012, also identified weaknesses at U.S. medical facilities that use 
high-risk radiological sources, such as cesium-137 (GAO, 2012).
The most likely pathway to a terrorist attack involving a radiological weapon 
involves theft of a radiological source, and the most likely scenario in which such a 
theft could occur involves the assistance of someone employed at a facility where 
radiological sources are used. It is impossible to determine whether private sector 
facilities are less secure than government facilities, or vice versa. This is why rules 
that apply to workers at a government facility are the same for workers at private 
sector facilities. There are several types of scenarios in which a terrorist group could 
ensure the cooperation of an insider at a radiological source facility. There could be 
coercion (e.g. extortion, or holding a family member hostage), bribery, ideological 
indoctrination, or deception, among many others. The fundamental concerns asso-
ciated with insider threat are relevant to both fissile and radiological material. Secu-
rity at these facilities is obviously paramount to confronting the threat of radiolo-
gical terrorism. There are also scenarios in which radiological source materials are 
seen as potentially vulnerable while in transit from one facility to another. The 
securi ty concerns with fissile materials in transit are limited because the quantities 
and protocols are significantly different when compared to radiological sources.
And yet, similar to the nuclear weapons challenges identified earlier, the odds are 
stacked against the rare terrorist group that may have interest in acquiring these 
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radiological source materials for use in a weapon. If you were the leader of such a 
group, you would need a significant amount of information on the facility where 
you might want to steal a radiological source; expertise on the proper storage and 
handling of radiological sources; detailed information on the size, weight, format 
(is it a powder, metal, liquid?), and other attributes of the radiological sources at the 
facility; and of course, information on the security procedures at the facility that are 
meant to ensure access to the radiological source for only authorized personnel. 
Further, the terrorists would need one or more individuals willing to take enor-
mous risks in attempting to steal and handle radiological source material, and yet 
intelligent enough to evade security and not draw attention to themselves. If the 
theft was successful, the group would need a safe means of transporting the stolen 
radiological source to another location, one where it could be stored and mani-
pulated into some kind of weaponized form - without the authorities and their 
radioactivity detectors tracking the group’s activities and disrupting the plot.
It is true that detailed instructions and schematics for constructing radiological 
weapons can be found on the Internet in multiple languages. A relatively intelli-
gent, skilled person equipped with these instructions, the right tools, and other 
resources may actually be able to design and construct the basic components of a 
weapon. But where will they find a radioactive source in a powdered form (for 
example), which could be dispersed in either an intentional release in a building’s 
HVAC system or in an exploding “dirty bomb”? Many radiological sources used in 
medicine are in the form of pills, and radiological sources used in industry are often 
in the form of metals. Without a radiological source in the right physical form – 
powder, liquid, pellets, etc. – and emitting the right levels of radioactivity, the 
weapon would be incomplete. For example, the 88 pounds of low-grade uranium 
stolen in July from a university in Iraq was not really a weapons-related threat. As 
noted earlier, low-grade uranium is not useful for a nuclear weapon. Further ura-
nium has a very long half-life, and thus the radiation it emits is very weak and 
would have a negligible effect if used in a radiological weapon (Oswald, 2014).
Meanwhile, as the terrorist plot grows in complexity, it requires the involvement of 
more individuals, risking the operational security of the group. The more people 
who know of a terrorist plot, the more likely one of them could become an infor-
mant for the police or government authorities. In sum, a variety of technical, stra-
tegic, tactical and operational challenges underscore the point made earlier: the 
more complicated the plot and the weapon, the less likely the chance of success. 
These challenges, coupled with the ideological and strategic constraints noted 
ea rlier, help explain why the true nature of the radiological or nuclear threat is limi-
ted to very few terrorists worldwide. Understanding the constraints faced by terro-
rists in the realm of nuclear and radiological weapons, in turn, can help us craft 
more targeted and effective counterterrorism and counterproliferation measures.
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Strategies for Countering the Threat of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
The goals of the international community in dealing with this challenge are rela-
tively straightforward: (1) deny the terrorists access to nuclear and radiological 
material, and (2) convince the terrorists that the use of such a weapon would be 
counterproductive to their ideological and strategic objectives. The second goal 
involves various forms of deterrence described in a recent report by the U.S. 
National Defense University: an unambiguous capacity to impose unacceptable 
costs on WMD-armed adversaries, an ability to attribute WMD attacks, and an 
abili ty to counter a WMD attack (e.g. through missile defense and homeland 
se curity measures) (Caves and Carus, 2014). Terrorists can indeed be deterred—we 
simply have to understand what the terrorist group holds dear, what it values most, 
and then demonstrate a capacity to have a negative impact on that (Kroenig and 
Pavel, 2012; Shapiro, 2013).
Much is being done in the realm of countering extremist ideology that is meant to 
deter a terrorist group from exploring the potential of nuclear or radiological 
we apons. But as Graham Allison succinctly noted over a decade ago, the most cru-
cial area of effort is in preventing access to nuclear and radiological materials 
(Al lison, 2004). Prevention requires a multifaceted effort that includes: (1) establish-
ing security standards for all materials and sources, (2) reducing inventories, (3) 
detecting illicit transport through a global detection architecture and (4) human 
resource management – continuous training and monitoring the emotional and 
psychological well-being of those who have access to nuclear and other radiolo-
gical material. There are a variety of national, regional and global efforts underway 
to address these issues. Perhaps the most well-known and globally reaching insti-
tution is the IAEA, established in 1956 to accelerate and broaden the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, and to ensure - through inspection and verification - that the signa-
tory countries of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) uphold the safeguards 
arrangements. The IAEA Department of Safeguards oversees the implementation 
of safeguards throughout the world. The safeguards system establishes legally 
binding agreements between nations and the IAEA pursuant to the commitments 
made under international and regional nonproliferation agreements. At the time of 
this writing there is no single authority or a legally binding agreement that com-
prehensively addresses the security of nuclear and radiological materials.
The role of the IAEA in ensuring security of the nuclear material is limited. For 
example, the safeguards agreements only apply to civilian facilities, in order to 
detect potential diversion of material for weapons use by a member state. They 
are not designed to provide physical security measures for the safeguarded faci-
lities. The agreements also allow nuclear-weapon states to designate certain facili-
ties as eligible for IAEA safeguards while excluding other facilities. Finally, 
the authority and budgetary resources of the IAEA constrain its ability to serve as 
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the comprehensive nuclear security watchdog for nuclear and other radiological 
materials worldwide.
The IAEA and its member states have taken steps to support the effort that reduce 
the overall threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. For example, the stockpiles 
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium were initially 
the only materials considered by IAEA as materials of concern for nuclear weapon. 
In the early 1990s, Neptunium-237, Americium-241 and reactor-grade plutonium 
were also considered as materials that could be used for the fabrication of nuclear 
weapon. There has also been a growing recognition of the need to provide com-
prehensive security for industrial and medical radiological sources. The inventories 
of radiological sources are much more diverse in their composition and are found 
in a wide range of facilities around the world. Theoretically, some isotopes would 
be more useful than others for a radiological weapon. For example, Strontium-90, 
Iridium-192, Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60 are widely believed to pose a significant 
threat, due to their availability and their physical/chemical characteristics. These 
isotopes, along with many other potential candidate materials for radiological 
weapon, are used globally for research, medical applications, and industry. As a 
result, the protection, monitoring and reporting of illicit activities related to radio-
logical sources has been a major challenge.
In 1995 the IAEA established an information system - the Illicit Trafficking Database 
(ITDB) - that archives incidents of illegal trafficking and unauthorized access of 
materials outside of regulatory control, as reported by participating countries.1 As 
of December 2013, 125 countries participate in the ITDB program, collectively 
provi ding an authoritative source of information on the scope of the challenge 
worldwide - as IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano noted in 2013, “Over a 
hu ndred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear 
and radioactive material are reported to the [IAEA] every year” (Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, 2014: 6). Overall, the availability of materials, the lack of uniform border 
controls and detection architectures, and the diversity among the perpetrators 
engaged in these illicit activities illustrate the complexity of the problem.
The world’s interest in nuclear energy has grown tremendously over the past 
deca de. Nuclear power currently provides 16% of the world’s electricity. There are 
437 nuclear power plants installed in 31 countries, and an additional 68 are under 
construction in 15 countries, including Belarus, Indonesia, Jordan, Thailand and the 
United Arab Emirates. Approximately 60 countries have announced plans to adopt 
or increase the share of their nuclear power to meet their growing energy needs. 
Supporting expanded access to nuclear power must be balanced against the securi ty 
concerns identified in this discussion.
In 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a concerted Nuclear Security Plan 
along with a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund. Further 
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Nuclear Security Plans were approved in 2005 and 2009. More recently, the IAEA 
proposed and approved the Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017. Through these efforts, 
the IAEA has identified a number of issues to address, cybersecurity, nuclear foren-
sics and a need for a well-developed nuclear security culture and a comprehensive 
nuclear security system. Another international initiative is the 1980 Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which - along with its 2005 
Amendment - is the only international legally binding agreement for the physical 
protection of nuclear material. The CPPNM is limited only to civilian nuclear 
ma terial and does not include military or other non-civilian materials. These two 
broad categories of materials include nearly 85 percent of the global stocks of 
we apons-usable nuclear material that can be found in different forms at broad 
range of use and facilities.
Other international efforts to address nuclear and radiological security include the 
three Nuclear Security Summits - in Washington (2010), Seoul (2012) and The 
Hague (2014) - which brought heads of state from around the world together to 
address the dangers of nuclear and radiological materials proliferation. During 
these summits, world leaders committed to developing a global nuclear security 
architecture and reducing the stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials. 
In addition to the removal of special nuclear materials and improved physical 
securi ty at a number of facilities worldwide, the international efforts of the last half 
decade have also resulted in bilateral and multilateral agreements of cooperation 
on tr aining and sharing of best practices.
Many nations have pursued their own bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce 
global inventories of nuclear and radiological materials and to improve their 
securi ty in response to terrorism concerns. During the 1990s and 2000s, Congress 
provided funding (via the Nunn-Lugar initiative) to help secure materials and facil-
ities in former Soviet Union nations. Through its Global Threat Reduction Initia-
tive, the U.S. has also led the effort to secure nuclear materials globally, set new 
security standards, and pursue partnerships with many countries to lock down 
sensitive materials. There are still concerns about certain facilities around the world 
that have less-than-adequate security of its nuclear materials, but the commitment 
to addressing these concerns has remained constant over the last several years.
There is also a significant need for nuclear security education and training. In addi-
tion to various programs offered by the IAEA, the organization also worked closely 
with experts and academics from member states to produce a guidance document 
for the development of educational programs in nuclear security. Finally, the IAEA 
hosts the International Nuclear Security Education Network, a partnership between 
IAEA, education and research institutions involved in nuclear security–related 
human resource development programs. In addition to IAEA efforts, non-profit 
organizations—like the world-renowned Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Institute for 
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Science and International Security, and the Center for Arms Control and Nonproli-
feration—have contributed to policy and public education, while a variety of aca-
de mic institutions, like Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and Inter-
national Affairs and Stanford University’s Center for International Security and 
Cooperation, have become influential sources for policy analysis and scholarship 
on nuclear and radiological security. At the University of Massachusetts Lowell 
(UML), two new initiatives - the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), 
and the Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Laboratories (INSSL) - bring 
together subject matter experts with other global institutional partners for a variety 
of educational and training activities, including one-day workshops or week-long 
professional development courses on topics such as nuclear security culture, infor-
mation security and cyber security, insider threats, international legal frameworks, 
radiation detection strategies and techniques, transportation security, nuclear and 
radiological forensics, and crime scene management. There is a need for both 
tr aining that will fill knowledge gaps, and education—sustained programs that 
will establish a cohort of nuclear security experts as the demand for this expertise 
continues to grow globally.
As evident from this list of topics, nuclear security (and nuclear safeguards) is by 
nature a multidisciplinary field, requiring expertise in a variety of technical and social 
science disciplines. Practitioners in this field need to understand fundamental nuclear 
physics and engineering, material science, risk assessment, computational techni-
ques, modeling and simulation, information technology, measurement techniques, 
and detector development. Those technical topics should be combined with social 
science topics such as political science, international relations, international law, 
energy policies, and regional studies. Faculty in UML’s School of Criminology and 
Justice Studies are working closely with the faculty in the university’s Nuclear Engi-
neering program - whose radiation laboratories, nuclear research reactor, and strate-
gic partnerships with Canberra Laboratories (the world leader in radiation detector 
development) - on development and delivery of education, training and research 
programs focused on nuclear security for the U.S. and international participants.
Specific research activities within INSSL include developing next generation radia-
tion detectors that allow capabilities for field identification of radioisotopes, 
enhanced nuclear materials accountancy and surveillance techniques; equipping 
autonomous robots with detector systems that can communicate remotely and pro-
vide spectral information, GPS coordinates, and other information useful for effi-
cient safeguards verification activities; and advanced computational tools for 
simula tions of multiple scenarios for experimental validation. Together, these 
efforts at UML reflect the ways in which academic institutions are contributing to 
developing critical human resources for nuclear security, and by extension aiding 
in the global response to reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.
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Conclusion
From the global to the national to the institutional levels, there are many efforts and 
initiatives working in tandem to address the concerns of nuclear and radiological 
security. These efforts, in turn, are making it increasingly difficult for any terrorist 
group to believe they could successful conduct an attack using a nuclear or radio-
logical weapon. Admittedly, the challenge is still a daunting one: according to a 
recent report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, “there are nearly 2,000 metric tons of 
weapons-usable nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium, separated plutonium, 
and the plutonium content in mixed oxide fuel) stored at hundreds of sites around 
the world; some of those materials are poorly secured and are vulnerable to theft or 
sale on the black market” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014). But as nations, interna-
tional organizations, universities and other entities contribute to a comprehensive 
response to this threat, developing and sharing best practices in nuclear security 
and safeguards, optimism about the future is warranted.
Of course, security concerns involving nuclear or radiological weapons have 
become a part of our daily lives. The public sees daily representations of this threat 
in news reports of one kind or another, as well as in movies and television shows. 
However, these are sources of information in which drama is often emphasized at 
the expense of factual accuracy. As a result, the public discourse about the threat of 
nuclear or radiological terrorism is infused by a significant amount of misunder-
standing and unfounded panic. Unfortunately, we see a similar pattern in the 
uninfor med rhetoric of some political leaders as well. Yes, the threat of a nuclear or 
radiological terrorist attack is real, and if such an attack ever happens it would 
certainly have terrible consequences. However, while a sense of urgency is warran-
ted, we must acknowledge all the limitations and caveats that are often overlooked 
in the public discourse. Importantly, most terrorists actually have not shown inte-
rest in these kinds of weapons. Further, it is highly unlikely that any nuclear-armed 
state would actually give or sell a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group. Radiological 
sources are more plentiful, and thus a radiological weapon is more likely than a 
nuclear one, but here too there are many limitations and parameters which cons-
train the threat.
The technical and operational challenges of making a nuclear or radiological 
weapon are extremely complex. Even if a terrorist group could overcome those 
diffi culties, the central challenge remains of acquiring enough of highly constrai-
ned and regulated radiological or nuclear materials, and in the right form, for their 
weapon. In general, the global stockpile of nuclear materials is relatively small, 
and the worldwide locations and uses of those materials are accurately known, but 
this is not true for radiological materials. Efforts on the part of IAEA, countries, 
academe and the private sector will lead to new insights and more effective 
approaches to addressing these security issues. These efforts must include the 
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development of nuclear security human resource development programs that are 
globally accessible. As more countries seek to develop peaceful uses of nuclear 
and radioactive materials, it is essential that they adopt nuclear security and safe-
guards into their plans.
In the end, there is no easy solution to the threat of nuclear or radiological terro-
rism. But the cumulative effect of the efforts described here - among many others - 
make it increasingly difficult that any terrorist group will have access to the essen-
tial materials for a nuclear or radiological weapon. The global movement to improve 
security and safeguards will make it virtually impossible for a terrorist group to 
successfully cross the nuclear or radiological threshold.
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